In the Introduction, we made the observation that the rule of law is a generally acknowledged political ideal. However, we also made it clear that the universal recognition of the merits of the rule of law has in no way been accompanied by a universally accepted definition of it. On the contrary, different people mean very different things when employing the term (Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008, pp. 12-13) . More particularly, one of the main problems burdening the rule of law research agenda is that the term is oftentimes employed without justifying or even spelling out the definition, and -partly as a consequence -without selecting empirical measures that match the stipulated (or intended) definition. Such nonchalance is problematical because the establishment of a technical language based on sound logical premises is a prerequisite for rigorous and cumulative research (Sartori, 1970) . This, in turn, demands that the competing definitions are clarified and ordered. This is the objective of the present chapter. On the pages that follow, we provide a panoramic view of rule of law definitions in the literature, based on the systematic guidelines that have been developed in political science over the latest decades (see, e.g., Sartori, 1970 Sartori, , 1984 Collier and Mahon, 1993; Adcock and Collier, 2001; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2006) .
Mapping the principal definitions
How may we systematically map the dominant definitions of the rule of law? Sartori's (1984, p. 41) advice is to 'first collect a representative set of definitions; second, extract their characteristics; and 1 Systematizing Thin and Thick Rule of Law Definitions third, construct matrixes that organize such characteristics meaningfully'. The first two steps entail a careful review of the literature and a subsequent disaggregation of the identified definitions. In line with Bedner (2010, p. 55), we see this two-fold exercise 'as purely heuristic: its argument is not that certain elements ought to be part of the rule of law concept, but rather which elements are claimed to be part of it according to the literature.' Regarding the third step, we turn to Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) notion of a tree-like conceptual structure, in which the concept is divided into its constituent dimensions, which are again divided into their constituent attributes and sub-components. The concept of the rule of law is highly complex and essentially contested. Thus, it is hardly surprising that 'much confusion over the meaning, aims, means and successes of rule of law promotion is currently prevalent among politicians, diplomats, and other practitioners' and that 'academia, if anything, is as much divided over the meaning and aims of the rule of law as practice ' (HiiL, 2007, p. 9) . Confronted with such conceptual ambiguity, the radical solution is to abandon the concept altogether and proceed in a more disaggregated way, that is, to drill down to particular sub-components such as, say, judicial independence (cf. Ríos-Figuera and Staton, 2012) . However, there is an obvious danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater here. Although essentially contested, the concept of the rule of law is almost certainly here to stay (Waldron, 2002) . This is reflected in the fact that many theories make use of a general understanding of the rule of law rather than its individual components, and that it has become virtually unthinkable that the concept should no longer be part of academic vocabulary and the parlance of politicians, pundits, and journalists. What is needed is therefore to strengthen the conceptualization of the key concept rather than to abandon it.
The first step of such an exercise is to sketch the common ground. Fuller (1969, p. 39) , Raz (1979, pp. 214-18), and Finnis (1980, pp. 170-1) have offered some of the most prominent definitions of the rule of law. In Table 1 .1 we have listed the core principles emphasized by these scholars.
As Table 1 .1 shows, the conceptions of Fuller, Raz, and Finnis are strikingly similar. But two expansions of these conceptions are frequently singled out in the literature as necessary. The first is what Raz (1979, p. 212) identifies when writing that,
